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Resumen: En 1959, doce países con alto grado de interés en la Antártida firmaron un Tra-
tado para permitir el libre acceso a la investigación científica pacífica. El Tratado Antártico 
estableció la ciencia y la cooperación internacional como su base, pero generó controversias 
al aceptar reclamos de soberanía sobre el territorio antártico. Esta investigación tiene como 
objetivo llenar un vacío bibliográfico al proponer una estricta periodización del Sistema del 
Tratado Antártico desde una perspectiva sistémica. El artículo también examina la adhesión 
de Brasil al Tratado. Utilizando como indicadores de legitimidad el aumento en la membresía 
y la transparencia de los procesos de toma de decisiones, el autor sostiene que el Sistema 
del Tratado Antártico pasó a ser reconocido como un régimen internacional legítimo. 
Palabras clave: Sistema del Tratado Antártico; Relaciones Internacionales; regímenes in-
ternacionales; perspectiva sistémica; cooperación internacional. 
Abstract: In 1959, twelve countries with a strong record of interest in Antarctica signed a 
Treaty allowing accessibility to all signatories wishing to conduct peaceful scientific research. 
The Antarctic Treaty established science and international cooperation as its cornerstones 
but raised controversies because of its hosting of sovereignty claims over Antarctic territory. 
This research aims to fill a gap in literature proposing a strict periodization of the Antarctic 
Treaty System under a systemic perspective. The paper also examines Brazil's accession to 
the Treaty. Using as indicators of legitimacy the increase in membership and the transpar-
ency of decision-making processes, the author argues that the Antarctic Treaty System has 
come to be recognized as a legitimate international regime.  
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This paper’s first objective is to investigate the transformation of the regime estab-
lished by the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) from a systemic perspective, by explaining its 
changes based on the attributes of the international environment and the internal contra-
dictions of the regime, and disregarding the states as variables (Keohane, 1983). Whilst not 
aspiring to provide an exhaustive account, we propose to examine the ATS diachronic tra-
jectory and separate it in three blocks of time in order to identify which political, economic 
and environmental drivers helped shape each one of them. Historical categorization ob-
serves restricted and debatable criteria that are convenient to the scholar but may uninten-
tionally deplete the phenomenon of its complexity. Such a framework, however, if based on 
solid historical foundations, can be useful for a comprehensive assessment of the shifting 
pattern of the ATS. The second goal is to verify Brazil’s accession to the ATS, emphasizing 
how it was the first country to withdraw from the bipolar logic that distinguished the prior 
affiliation to the Treaty and how this enabled other global southern states to sign up as well.  
The temporal periodization demarks each phase, proposing years and concrete epi-
sodes to correlate the international context with the ATS milestones. Though the analysis of 
circumstances around the signature and ATS evolution are recurrent in academic work dis-
cussing the Antarctic, such literature usually approaches the ATS phases with broad bound-
aries, focusing more on the regime´s internal dynamics than on the external drivers respon-
sible for its changes. Experts like Hemmings (2009; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2017) and Chatuverdi 
(1986; 2011; 2013; 2015) refer to the regime history as a background to debate present 
issues related to it or to analyze the Australian and Indian positions in the ATS. 
The three phases of the ATS display different characteristics. The first one proceeds 
under the logic of the Cold War and bipolar dynamics, and portrays a still incipient regime 
with few partners (1961-78). The second phase stands out through the massive admission 
of new state actors and an increase in the transparency of their relationships (1979-91). The 
last phase strengthens the previous changes (1992- to date). 
According to Young (2011), the effectiveness of an international regime stems from 
its degree of legitimacy and fairness. Based on this understanding, the second objective of 
this paper is to measure the advance of ATS legitimacy, using the increase in membership 
and the access to decision-making processes as indicators. The concept of regime used in 
this paper observes the definition provided by Krasner (1983), as the set of principles, 
norms, rules and procedures around which the players of international relations converge. 
Krasner distinguishes between change within the regime and change of regime. The first 
case is more commonplace and entails a simple correction of rules and procedures, whereas 
the change of regime presupposes a qualitative transformation, when there is an alteration 
of the principles and norms that define its nature.  
The twelve original signatories to the ATS negotiated an agreement that ensured their 
own powerful interests whilst excluding the rest of the world from it. In due time, the regime 
evolved as a result of a new balance of power and of its own dynamic nature. The consulta-
tive members, along the way, adapted the ATS rules and decision-making procedures so as 
to make them more transparent and inclusive. By examining the ATS trajectory, it will be 
possible to assess how, despite the corrections in its procedures and rules, its principles and 
norms remained the same, characterizing a change within the regime, but not of regime. 
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These changes allowed the ATS to overcome controversy and achieve the representative-
ness and legitimacy that led to its permanence. 
1. Before the Treaty  
Until 1959, and due to its geographic characteristics, Antarctica lacked legal status. 
Discovered in 1822, it only began to attract interest in the Twentieth Century, when the first 
claims to sovereignty occurred. Seven countries, arguing discovery or contiguity, announced 
their claims over the Terra Nullius: United Kingdom (1908), New Zealand (1923), France 
(1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1942). 
The Antarctic Treaty (1959) was an attempt to give international status to the conti-
nent and, at the same time, not to contradict the claims of sovereignty. The solution was to 
postpone the claims indefinitely, without putting an end to them. In Washington, twelve 
countries accommodated the recognition and moratorium of territorial aspirations with the 
project of preserving the continent for scientific research. These countries were summoned 
to the conference because, the year before, during the International Geophysical Year (IGY), 
they had established scientific research bases in the Antarctic continent. The seven claimant 
countries agreed to defer their claims without renouncing them (Article IV), and the conti-
nent became accessible to the Treaty signatories committed to peaceful research. The re-
gime intended to safeguard the region from the political/military/environmental stand-
point, and to promote "international co-operation in scientific investigation in Antarctica" 
(Article III). 
Furthermore, the Treaty overcame the scenario of bipolar dissent and guaranteed co-
operation among the signatories: United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argen-
tina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, United Kingdom and 
Union of South Africa. Although legal, the exclusion of a significant part of the world com-
munity in the management of a vital continent for the planet’s sustainability jeopardized 
the international legitimacy of the regime. To survive, the agreement would need to become 
more inclusive and transparent. This indeed happened and today the ATS has 53 signatories. 
2. For consultative members only: the reserved first phase (1961-
1978)  
The first phase starts with the Antarctic Treaty coming into force on 23 June 1961 and 
ends seventeen years later, when the inclusion of a further agreement, the Convention for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1978), transformed the Treaty into a system3. All other 
additional conventions and protocols were signed in the next phase. 
                                                          
3 The Antarctic Treaty System consists of the original Treaty, to which the following were added: the Con-
vention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Ma-
rine Living Resources (1980) and the Madrid Protocol (for environmental protection - 1991). In 1969, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provided a legal framework for all international agreements 
signed between sovereign states. The ATS has also an association called Scientific Committee on Antarctic 
Research (SCAR), which is responsible for coordinating scientific activity and advising the ATS on everything 
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In the early 1960s, a sequence of incidents increased the friction between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The Bay of Pigs invasion (April 1961), the construction of the 
Berlin Wall (August 1961) and the Missile Crisis (October 1962) happened in sync with an 
unprecedented development of military technology. Despite the sense of impending con-
flict, both Washington and Moscow avoided open confrontation and agreed to implement 
external policies of dissuasion and peaceful coexistence. The dissuasion concept was to per-
suade the adversary of the damaging power of mutual retaliation. Peaceful coexistence, 
even without embracing peace, acknowledged the existence of the other superpower and 
admitted the principles of sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression and 
non-interference in domestic affairs. 
According to this paper’s first objective, it is possible to assert the role of the global 
structure of power on the composition of the ATS. The bipolar nature of international rela-
tions dominated the process of joining the regime. Initially, only the Warsaw Pact member 
countries, Poland (1961), Czechoslovakia (1962), Romania (1971), East Germany (1974), Bul-
garia (1978) and the NATO countries, Denmark (1965) and the Netherlands (1967), signed 
the agreement. 
The Soviet Union sought to offset the geopolitical imbalance of a Treaty with a major-
ity of pro-Western States, calling on their satellites to join the regime. Moreover, Brazil's 
accession to the ATS in 1975 was a turning point in this binary scenario. The avant-gardism 
of the Brazilian case is interesting. With the exception of the original members (Argentina 
and Chile), Brazil was the first non-European country, uncommitted to the two main military 
alliances of the world, to sign the Antarctic Treaty.  
In the constellation of Soviet satellites joining the ATS, special attention should be 
given to the absence of the People's Republic of China, the most populous communist coun-
try in the world and with the potential of playing a decisive role in the balance of the regime. 
The USA, allied with Nationalist China (Formosa), prevented the inclusion of "Red China" in 
major international projects and organizations. During the preliminary meetings of the 
Treaty in Washington, the admission system to the ATS was the subject of much contro-
versy. The Soviet Union advocated admitting into the Treaty all States with which the origi-
nal members maintained diplomatic relations, an initiative that would allow access to China. 
The United Kingdom, however, supported restricted membership: only the Member-States 
of the United Nations Organization (UN), of which the PRC had been excluded since 1949, 
could be admitted. The negotiated solution was to approve access to the UN Member-
States, but allowing others to be suggested, as long as the original and active members 
agreed4. This provision enabled the consultative parties to exercise a veto power and com-
promised the balance of power sought by the USSR (Costa, 1961).  
                                                          
concerning this topic. Together, the ATS and SCAR encompass both the diplomatic and scientific manage-
ment of the continent. With regard to the frequency of meetings since 1994, ATS consultative members 
have met annually instead of every two years. With the entry into force of the Madrid Protocol (1998), the 
committee for the protection of the environment also meets annually. Special conferences - which serve to 
address specific issues - continue to be convened on a random basis. Expert organisations such as the Inter-
national Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO), the Council of Managers of National Antarctic 
Programs (COMNAP), Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) and others, act as observers during 
ATS meetings. 
4 All consultative members which acquired this status after the original twelve are considered active mem-
bers. Article XIII of the Treaty details the conditions for accession. 
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In this initial phase, the Sino-Soviet alliance already showed the first signs of the fis-
sure that would lead to a diplomatic rupture in 1964. The divergences between both coun-
tries were geopolitical and ideological. The Chinese revolution had initially been hailed by 
Moscow as a victory of international communism, but it soon became clear that the neigh-
boring country would not align with or submit to the Soviet order. From the 1970s and in a 
motion of Realpolitik, China sought a strategic rapprochement with the United States that 
eventually led to its admission to the UN and its access to the ATS during the second phase. 
When the ATS came into force, four countries in the world possessed nuclear technol-
ogy. The USA was the precursor with the USSR following closely. The United Kingdom and 
France also developed their nuclear programs and helped foster the continued arms race 
between the two hegemons. 
Although the destructive potential of nuclear weapons was wellknown, the isolation 
and emptiness of Antarctica encouraged the Americans to defend the site as an interna-
tional deposit of radioactive waste and location to perform tests. Argentina, backed by the 
countries of the southern hemisphere and the Soviet Union, called for a ban on any proce-
dure of military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive materials. The 
signing of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) sustained this 
trend, restricting this technology to the permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
In 1961, environmental issues had not yet been introduced into the international po-
litical agenda. The release of books such as "Silent Spring" (Carson,1962) and "Avant que 
Nature meure" (Dorst,1965) aroused public opinion on the harmful effects of industrial pro-
gress. As the civil society in developed economies became aware of the risks of human ac-
tivity on the planet, the debate acquired a more political bias, whose outcomes were the 
conference of the Biosphere (Paris 1968) and the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm 1972). Their goal was to avoid the advance of the environmental 
degradation of our habitat. With regard to Antarctica, the environmental discussion re-
mained at the conservationist level and prioritized the fauna, leading up to the Convention 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
In 1973, the rise in the price of oil finally buried the three decades of continuous 
growth that had characterized the post-war economic recovery. Some structural evidences 
foreboded the crisis: developed economies lived the challenge of financing an advanced 
model of social welfare in the midst of declining industrial productivity. Though moderate, 
unemployment and inflationary trends persisted. The collapse of the Bretton Woods order 
and changes in the international financial system due to the end of the dollar-gold parity 
worsened the situation and resulted in the oil crisis. 
Faced with the devaluation of the dollar and an insufficient readjustment index to re-
cover the loss of purchasing power in gold per barrel, the OPEC countries decided to nego-
tiate a price increase with the oil companies. In October 1973, the Yom Kippur war cut short 
the talks and broke off the deal. The rise in the price of oil sank the world into an unprece-
dented energy and economic crisis, hindering the productive activity that depended on fossil 
energy source. 
The international crisis had a direct impact on the meetings’ content of the ATS con-
sultative members. Antarctic mineral exploration, formerly discarded, was once again in-
cluded in the discussion agenda. From 1974 on, it became a regular subject in all sessions, 
whether they were expert meetings or informal working groups (Qasim and Rajan, 1985). 
At the consultative meeting in London (1977), it was recommended that the parties agree 
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on a regulatory regime prior to undertaking mineral exploration activity. One of the factors 
that motivated the great demand for the regime in the next phase was the expectation of 
an ATS revision. 
Brazil´s accession to the ATS  
Brazil, unlike Argentina and Chile, who promptly roused to the importance of Antarc-
tica, ignored the very presence of the continent until the eve of the IGY5. This position was 
representative of the priority given by Brazilian geopoliticians to ensure the occupation of 
the inner regions of a country the size of a continent. The first Brazilian considerations on 
Antarctica were set forth by geopoliticians Therezinha de Castro and Delgado de Carvalho 
who, in 1956, submitted a Frontage theory inspired by Pascal Poirier's Sector theory for the 
splitting of the Arctic. 
According to them, Antarctica should be divided among all the South American coastal 
countries that faced the white continent: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uru-
guay. In this regard, Brazil would be entitled to a section claimed by both the United King-
dom and Argentina (Ferreira, 2009). The Frontage theory had a strategic-military focus and 
expressed the military concern for national security. The authors even recommended the 
installation of air control bases in Antarctica. For a better understanding of this proposal, 
we have to remember that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty - 
1947) planned for the union and defense of the American continent, included in its strategic 
area, a fraction of Antarctica claimed by Argentina, Chile and United Kingdom as well as a 
fraction that could be claimed by the United States6. 
The IGY, held between 1957 and 1958, coincided with the Presidency of Juscelino Ku-
bistchek, the onset of his Goals Program and the construction of the new capital. Brazil co-
operated in the IGY, but was oblivious to the importance of a more active participation in its 
scientific project. It installed data processing bases only in the national territory and did not 
send an expedition and/or settled a base in the Antarctic continent. It was not known, then, 
that this would be the convening criterion for participation in the Washington conference.  
When Brazil discovered it had been excluded from the conference, it reacted through 
diplomatic channels and sent a formal note of protest to the US Embassy (07/30/1958). It 
complained that all the American countries with political, economic or strategic interests in 
Antarctica should have been invited to participate. Brazil needed to protect its extensive 
and exposed coastline and national safety was reason enough to justify its interest in Ant-
arctica. There was a fear that the Cold War could reach southern regions, especially due to 
the Soviet Union presence in the area and recent warning of unidentified submarines in 
South American territorial waters. Thus, the Brazilian government reserved its right to free 
access of Antarctica and to claim what it deemed necessary and felt free from complying 
with any deliberation that failed to satisfy it (Bath, 2000). 
                                                          
5 Argentina and Chile were the last countries to formalize their territorial claims. This delay is due to not 
having considered, until then, the need to justify their sovereignty before the world, for since their inde-
pendence from Spain they had considered their territories as extending up to the South Pole.  
6 It was Argentinian pressure that expanded the safety zone covered by the Rio Treaty to include the South 
Pole sector, also claimed by the United Kingdom.  
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Brazil's protest caused little repercussion in domestic and foreign policy. Internally, 
Brazil pursued industrial economic development, while internationally it sought to 
strengthen relations with other South American countries. Kubistchek launched the Pan-
American Operation, aiming to fight economic underdevelopment (and the risk of com-
munism) through a joint multilateral policy with the rest of Latin America. Brazil´s aspiration 
was to exercise more influence over the region and it deliberately chose not to antagonize 
the concrete interests of Argentina and Chile in the Antarctic continent. In the international 
system, regardless of being the largest country in Latin America and the fifth in the world, 
Brazil remained a peripheral player who hardly affected the whole. Lacking a clear position 
on the Antarctic matter, Brazil decided to go along with the international alternative. 
Throughout the 1960s, under the Jânio Quadros / João Goulart’s administrations or 
under the military dictatorship, little progress was made on the subject. Before the coup, 
the Independent Foreign Policy sought a higher international insertion for Brazil through 
dialogue and partnerships with countries that could respond to national needs, even if not 
aligned with American interests (Viana, 2009). During the first military mandates, due to 
ideological affinities related to anti-communist discourse, there was a deeper alignment 
with the United States, favoring the east-west antagonism in detriment of the north-south 
one (Cervo and Bueno, 2012). 
In the 1970s, many circumstances helped change Brazil´s perception of Antarctica. If, 
at the beginning of the decade, Brazil boasted high growth rates due to the "economic mir-
acle", in the following years the oil crisis, the collapse of Bretton Woods and the decrease in 
the pace of economic growth caused a transformation of both the national context and of 
Brazilian foreign policy. Under Ernesto Geisel’s administration, responsible pragmatism de-
veloped a model of foreign relations based less on ideological matters and more on Brazil’s 
taking part in other political and economic co-operations. South-south relations and rela-
tions with the African and Asian continents were consolidated (Cervo and Bueno, 2012). This 
new policy allowed Brazil to play a more assertive role concerning Global South settings and 
introduced a novel approach towards Antarctica. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the early 1970s coincided with new support arrangements 
given to the Frontage theory by Federal Deputy Eurípides Cardozo de Menezes, Therezinha 
de Castro’s friend. The deputy, who had attended the Escola Superior de Guerra (Brazilian 
War College) and defended a paper entitled “Antarctica, international interests”, called for 
Brazilian presence in the continent (Mattos, 2015). His mobilization led to the creation, in 
September 1972, of the Brazilian Institute for Antarctic Research, a private entity related to 
the Engineering Club, which tried to organize a scientific expedition to the continent. The 
initiative was not met by the government’s approval since it could regionally be interpreted 
as a provocation to Argentina and would reverse the order of events internationally, pro-
moting the mission prior to accession of the Treaty. 
Under Geisel’s administration, Brazil finally determined its position on the matter of Ant-
arctica. Brazil gave up the Frontage theory, supported by the militaries, and accepted Itama-
raty's thesis, devised by diplomat João Frank da Costa. Recognizing the Treaty as the only valid 
instrument for the governance of the region, the expert had recommended joining the ATS 
and gaining consultative status. In spite of the existing divergences between Brazil and Argen-
tina, the affiliation to the ATS was considered timely as it had the merit of eluding the political 
conflict between the two countries over the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant. By 
giving up the principle of territoriality of the Frontage Theory, Brazil conveyed a conciliatory 
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stance towards Argentina while at the same time emphasizing the sovereignty of its interna-
tional decisions. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) refer to the significance of belonging to inter-
national organizations as a means to confer more legitimacy to a regime. Joining the ATS re-
flects the Brazilian military regime´s need for national and international validation and coin-
cides with the beginning of its liberalization under Geisel’s Presidency. 
Domestic policy launched the Pro-ethanol Program whereas foreign policy started 
considering the possible revision of the Treaty in 1991. Although neither Brazil nor the tech-
nologically-developed nations had the skills to exploit Antarctic mineral resources, it was 
essential that the country could take part in this debate. The strategic vision of Geisel and 
Chancellor Azeredo da Silveira negotiated Brazil´s accession into an international regime 
(May 1975), which until then had only been joined by the NATO and Warsaw Pact member 
countries. It was the ATS first step in becoming more inclusive in relation to Global South 
states. 
In this first phase, we should note the concentration of power resulting from the delay 
in achieving consultative status. Of the nine new members admitted to the Treaty, only the 
oldest, Poland, acquired consultative status after 16 years. In the first 20 years of existence, 
ATS's decision-making framework remained virtually unchanged, with resolutions in the hands 
of the original members to the detriment of the others. The ATS demanded “substantial scien-
tific research activity” (Art. IX §2) for the acquisition of consultative status, which contradicted 
science as a tool of inclusion and allowed for the continuity of post-colonial domination (El-
zinga, 2009; Dodds, 2017)7. This monopoly of power and resistance to relinquish the status 
quo could have affected the durability and effectiveness of the regime if it had been main-
tained in the following phases (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983). 
In 1978, the entry into force of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
concluded the first phase of the Treaty. That same year, the Iranian fundamentalist revolu-
tion disrupted the world oil geopolitics and removed the country from the Western alliance 
to which it had belonged, contributing to cause a new oil shock. 
3. Who is knocking at the door? The responsive second phase (1979-
91)  
The second phase begins with a new oil shock. The Soviet Union, which had important 
oil deposits in Siberia, saw an increase in the revenue of its exports. In a political-strategic 
attempt to position themselves near the Persian Gulf, strengthen the Brezhnev doctrine and 
achieve greater projection in international politics, the Russians invaded Afghanistan, trig-
gering a resumption of the Cold War. The second phase ends in 1991 with the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact (March) and the break-up of the Soviet Union. That same year, the Madrid 
Protocol, an environmental document that postponed the prospects of mineral exploration 
of the continent for 50 years, was signed.  
                                                          
7 According to post-colonial scholars, the lack of indigenous human population and hence of resistance to 
colonial rule does not exclude Antarctica from being discussed under this novel approach. Post-colonialism 
in Antarctica reveals itself through other behaviors, like sovereignty claiming, unequal political influence, 
continuous human presence, among others.  
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This period witnessed the political strengthening of developing countries claiming for 
a New International Economic Order at the United Nations forum. According to Puchala and 
Hopkins (1983), the 1980s was a period of restructuring regimes and the ATS was in line with 
this process through a revision of the nature and distribution of power. The second phase is 
known for the increase in new memberships (21 countries in 13 years) and for being able to 
solve unfinished issues. 
The wars in the 1980s had repercussions on the international economic and political 
structure, either by interfering with the supply of oil or through their role in the inflection 
of the world order. The loss of Iran, Washington´s most trusted ally in the Middle East, led 
the United States to forge new relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq. In 1980, the Iran-
Iraq war, brought about by border disputes, was additionally fueled by oil geopolitical inter-
ests and ideological antagonisms. The war lasted a decade, ruined both countries and sub-
sequently entailed the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq and the first Gulf War (1990/91). In 
Afghanistan, Soviets concerned with preserving an enclave aligned with Moscow and faced 
the resistance of the Mujahideen rebels. The "Soviet Vietnam" eventually triggered the col-
lapse of the great power and paved the way for the so-called clash of civilizations.  
Furthermore, the war for the sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands exposed 
the importance of the contiguous region to Antarctica. It rekindled strategic interest in that 
environment, undermined the Argentine military government and foreshadowed the de-
cline of authoritarian regimes. In the following years, the re-democratization movement en-
compassed both Latin American and Eastern European countries. 
In this second phase, the increasing participation of peripheral countries in the inter-
national order affected the ATS structure and promoted a more multipolar balance of 
power. The ATS went through a “crisis of legitimacy” (Hemmings, 2017, p.3) and became 
more inclusive and diversified. The binary logic of State accession was overcome, and the 
membership of Latin American countries and non-aligned powers, like China and India, 
added to the regime´s greater plurality and legitimacy. 
China joined the ATS in 1983, as a postponed result of its rapprochement with the 
West. The first effect of this reconciliation was Resolution 2758, which led to the People's 
Republic of China accessing the UN instead of Taiwan (October 1971). In 1978, China's se-
vere payment crisis and capital shortages led Deng Xiaoping to review the country's eco-
nomic policy. Beijing admitted a less ideological development model and adopted a prag-
matic foreign policy of greater openness to the world. The "open door" policy encouraged 
China to join leading international organizations in order to attract foreign investment and 
became the first step towards its "peaceful rise" (Barnett, 1986). 
China's accession into the ATS was rather a political endeavor to enter the interna-
tional system than a scientific project. Chinese scientists were invited to join the expeditions 
of the Antarctic programs of Australia, New Zealand and the USA in order to establish coop-
eration and acquire the necessary skills to undertake their own mission. The first Chinese 
expedition to Antarctica took place in 1984 and the country achieved consultative status the 
following year (Brady, 2013). Since then, China has increased its role in Antarctica and in-
vested systematically in the continent. 
Two months after China, it was India's turn to join the ATS. The inclusion provoked 
much controversy because India had previously favored an internationalization of Antarctica 
and had consistently insisted that this issue should be examined at the United Nations as-
sembly (Villa, 2004). 
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Indian foreign policy started getting involved in issues of global concern since the rule 
of Prime Minister Nehru. The main complaint concerning Antarctica and the ATS were the 
territorial claims and their Euro-colonial bias. Ironically, Indian attempts to bring the case to 
the UN (1956 and 1958) were met with the resistance of two former colonies, Argentina and 
Chile, who mustered forces against what was intended to be an anti-imperialist coalition on 
the Antarctic issue (Chatuverdi, 2013)8. 
During the following two decades, domestic problems relegated Antarctica to the 
sidelines of Indian agenda and it was only under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the coun-
try dealt with this geopolitical issue by means of an unconventional strategy. In 1982, India 
sent two scientific expeditions to Antarctica, relying on the principle that the ATS was open 
to all UN countries and provided the missions were for peaceful purposes (Sharma, 2001). 
Although the attitude was not unlawful, it was not warranted either, because the Treaty had 
first to be signed for the mission to be dispatched. The ATS, though, like other international 
regimes, lacked an enforcement mechanism to control behavioral deviations (Puchala and 
Hopkins, 1983). On the eve of the twelfth meeting (September 1983), India not only joined 
the ATS but acquired a consultative status within 24 days, the fastest process in the history 
of the regime. It was the way the ATS found to control the deviant behavior of that country. 
Among the other signatories, India's admission as a consultative member raised the 
suspicion that it was a strategy to pressure internal divisions and implode the regime. 
Among the non-aligned countries, the Indian attitude was considered as defection and re-
nunciation of its politically provocative role (Chaturvedi, 2013). 
In 1983, another incident agitated the ATS. Because of the apartheid policy, some gov-
ernments in the Caribbean and Africa, backed by Malaysia, objected to South Africa's mem-
bership in the regime. Although the specific target was South Africa, the purpose of the cri-
tique was broader and addressed the colonialist nature of Antarctic governance, its lack of 
transparency and the perpetuation of the privilege of a few countries. The discussion was 
set against the recent background of the Montego Bay Convention (1982), which allowed 
conjecturing apropos the internationalization of Antarctica on the basis of the common her-
itage of mankind. However, the ATS chose not to exclude South Africa, claiming that its do-
mestic policy did not interfere with the Antarctic cooperation regime (Peterson, 1988). 
Throughout the 1980s, Malaysia acted as a spokesperson for the non-aligned coun-
tries to denounce the ATS. According to the bloc, the illegitimacy of the regime derived from 
its anachronistic reproduction of colonial political domination assigning the continent and 
its wealth to the exclusive interest of the consultative parties (Scott, 2011). 
At the UN General Assembly (1982/83), Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir insisted 
that the organization create a mechanism to supervise the ATS. It was unjustifiable that out 
of the 157 nations that constituted UN, only 14 should manage a territory amounting to 10% 
of the planet's surface without being accountable for it (Krasner, 1985). Despite dismissing 
the economic exploitation of Antarctica because of its potential environmental impact, Ma-
hathir advocated that the governance of the continent concerned and should benefit all 
                                                          
8 Argentina and Chile feared that, in a forum such as the United Nations, the sovereignty they claimed 
would be considered illegitimate, and they rushed to overthrow the Indian initiative. It is important to re-
member that Argentina, in the 1950s, was among the first fifteen economies of the world, making the coun-
try a respected player in the territorial cause. It was a Chilean jurist, Julio Escudero Guzman, who suggested 
the moratorium of territorial claims that supported the Antarctic Treaty. 
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mankind (Hamzah, 2013). The discourse of the non-aligned countries de-escalated when In-
dia, Brazil and China became consultative members of the ATS. However, Malaysian foreign 
policy persisted on its objections against the ATS until 1998, when an invitation from the 
New Zealand government to make their Antarctic station available to the scientists from 
that country moderated the official position.  
Denunciations of the ATS by non-aligned countries had the merit of improving the 
transparency of the meetings, allowing them to be accompanied by non-consultative parties 
and also by some NGOs. Until 1983, meetings were exclusively attended by consultative 
members and took place behind closed doors, making the regime look ambiguous and 
shady. From that point on, and even without the power of decision-making, the other par-
ties were able to play a more active role (Woolcott, 1986). 
Although the regime experienced internal contradictions, it was the external pres-
sures, coming from the international power structure, that helped them unfold (Puchala and 
Hopkins, 1983). According to Keohane (1983), the decision to belong to a regime depends 
on whether the benefits outweigh the costs. Even if at a disadvantage compared to other 
members, a participant may choose to join a regime for the assurance it provides (Keohane, 
1983). Belonging to the ATS, even as a non-consultative member, was possibly more pro-
ductive than being left out, especially in the face of uncertainty about the future of Antarc-
tica. The new international balance of forces meant that initial compliance was replaced by 
greater assertiveness reflecting new national interests. It should be clear, however, that 
there were no changes in decision-making power, only in the procedures of the meetings. 
Greater transparency is a change within the regime, but not of regime. 
In the second phase, there was an increase in the countries joining the ATS: the inflec-
tion point of this internationalization coincides with India's access into the organization (Fin-
nemore and Sikkink, 1998). When India violated the implicit norm and later relinquished its 
critical stance, a cascade effect led to the international community’s legitimizing the ATS. 
The admission of new players was triggered by the evolving multipolar balance of the inter-
national order and hinted at the general assumption regarding a revision of the Treaty in 
1991. Participation in a debate that would perhaps allow for the economic exploitation of 
mineral resources on the continent was an international geopolitical necessity. Faced with 
the prospect of a change of rules and in order to ensure their presence on the continent, 
China, India and nineteen other countries hastily joined the ATS and strove to obtain con-
sultative status in time to participate in the decision-making process. 
Between 1982 and 1988, the development of a regulatory framework for the explora-
tion of mineral resources in Antarctica (Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities - CRAMRA) dominated the agenda of the consultative members. The 
complexity of the issue, the difficulty of accommodating economic needs with the preser-
vation of Antarctica, and the divergence in the interests of each party made it difficult to 
compose CRAMRA. Three positions had to be conciliated.  
Countries with territorial claims (with the exception of France and the United King-
dom) defended their sovereign rights in the exploitation of the claimed territories. The coun-
tries with no territorial claims, but developed and with scientific capacity, proposed the un-
restricted access to Antarctica with the earnings returning to the investors. Developing 
countries, lacking technical competence, argued that technology is common to mankind and 
that there should be an equitable distribution of the benefits of mineral exploitation (Kras-
ner, 1985). 
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Discussions around CRAMRA became even more complex when confronted to the the-
oretical model established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS) in 1982. Among the most significant contributions of UNCLOS are the extension of 
sovereignty for coastal States and the concept of common heritage of mankind for the in-
ternational seabed. Some countries and consultative members of the ATS felt uneasy about 
the possibility that this last concept be extended to Antarctica. 
The concept of common heritage of mankind originated in 1967 from an evolution of 
the Latin term res communis omnium and res communis humanitatus (Baslar, 1998)9. De-
spite their similar nature, res communis and common heritage of mankind have different 
meanings. Both deal with goods and resources that cannot become private property; how-
ever, res communis can be the object of access and free exploitation (Mercure apud Mon-
tastier, 2009). In the case of common heritage, it is a distribution model in which the benefits 
of exploitation must be shared by all States and distributed amongst all people regardless 
of their participation in the extraction (Baslar 1998; Buck 1998). The concept of common 
heritage of mankind evokes an ethical perspective for a more egalitarian world order, in-
cluding increased responsibility for the environment. 
Amid controversy, the concept of common heritage of mankind established by UN-
CLOS was discarded from the debates on CRAMRA on account of being regarded as inappli-
cable to Antarctica. Nonetheless, the UNCLOS provided an argument to claim for an expan-
sion of the territorial demands of the countries on the ATS. The Law of the Sea, upon con-
firmation of the presence of an underwater platform extending the length of their coast-
lines, allowed coastal States to claim a continental area beyond the 200 nautical miles limit 
(article 76). The claim had to be endorsed by scientific data and would then be assessed by 
a technical committee. The ATS territorial States asserted their claim before the expiration 
deadline of 10 years established by UNCLOS. However, as Article IV, paragraph 2, of the 
Treaty prohibited new claims of sovereignty or extension of the existing ones, in order to 
avoid conflicts, the demands were accompanied by an instruction to postpone analysis sine 
die (Haward, 2011). The understanding applied to UNCLOS allowed the principles of the ATS 
to remain intact, so no regime change took place (Krasner 1983; Qasim and Rajan, 1986). 
CRAMRA was concluded in Wellington in June 1988 and opened for signature on 25th 
November of the same year. Regardless of its ability to accommodate conflicting interests 
and address resources and promote distribution, it was abandoned the following year with-
out being ratified. The rejection began when, in France and Australia, a conjunction of the 
green and left parties took office. The withdrawal of these two countries disrupted Belgium 
and Italy and influenced the other signatories (Jacobsson, 2009). 
It may seem that CRAMRA's collapse was due to domestic changes in some of the ATS 
actors, but exogenous international political and environmental factors precipitated this set-
back. On the one hand, compliance with CRAMRA, despite the care taken in its drafting, 
could jeopardize rights associated with territorial sovereignty and therefore disturb interna-
tional balance (Boyd, 2002). On the other hand, the 1980s coincided with the expansion of 
environmental movements and their growing influence on the international political sce-
nario. 
                                                          
9 In Roman law, the concept of Res Communis omnium refers to those goods that belong to all beings, like 
the sea, the moving water and the air. 
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Environmental problems previously circumscribed to scientific discourse gained visi-
bility vis-à-vis public opinion and were incorporated into the political agenda. Incidents of 
environmental contamination, such as the Union Carbide in Bhopal (1984), the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster (1986), the Exxon Valdez Oil spill on the coast of Alaska (1989) and Paradise 
Harbor in Antarctica (1989), attracted international media attention and revealed, in addi-
tion to the lack of transparency, the foolhardiness of companies and governments.  
In 1987, the release of "Our Common Future" (Bruntland Report from UN), which pro-
claimed the so-called sustainable development, asserted that current development should 
not compromise the wellbeing of future generations. Environmental NGOs denounced the 
predatory model of development and encouraged green activism. The re-democratization 
of Latin America and Eastern Europe endorsed the rise of parties along those lines, which 
eventually led to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED-
92) in Rio de Janeiro and to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 
The non-ratification of CRAMRA prompted the drafting of a new protocol to reinforce 
and not to alter the ATS. The Protocol of Environmental Protection of the Antarctic Treaty 
(Madrid Protocol) prohibited any activity concerning exploration of Antarctic mineral re-
sources other than for the purpose of scientific research (art. 7). Signed in 1991and ratified 
in 1998, it will remain in force until 2048. Until that date, the protocol is practically invulner-
able for it can only be modified with the unanimous consent of the consultative parties and 
requires the creation of a prior legal regime to define which activities are acceptable and 
under what conditions. The Madrid Protocol, even without declaring Antarctica a common 
heritage of mankind, moved toward this notion by recognizing in its preamble that a protec-
tion regime of the Antarctic environment “is in the interest of mankind as a whole." 
The withdrawing of CRAMRA and the signing of the Madrid Protocol were approved 
by the Global South states and celebrated by the environmental movement. The rejection 
of CRAMRA is explained not only by the environmental impact it could cause but also by the 
political cost of a possible international destabilizing of the region (Boyd, 2002). 
Between 1987 and 1991, Greenpeace operated in Antarctica, evidencing the growing 
influence of transnational non-state actors in the execution of international policy, particu-
larly in the environmental sphere. The NGO set up a station, World Park Base, which moni-
tored the impact that human activities from the scientific bases had on the continent and 
issued a report describing infractions and negligence in dealing with the environment. If sci-
entists adopted irresponsible practices, such as raw sewage dumped in coastal waters and 
burning of waste, what was to be expected from the extractive activities? In view of this 
scenario, Greenpeace began to enjoin the transformation of Antarctica into a natural re-
serve or world park. 
The endorsement of the Madrid Protocol shows growing environmental recognition 
by the field of international relations and pertains to a new understanding of what consti-
tutes security. In the face of the formal cessation of the Cold War and thus of the risk of a 
nuclear war, the exclusive military focus shifted to one that comprised environmental risks, 
such as those arising from climate change, water scarcity and unsustainable exploitation of 
resources, among others (Serpa, 2013). In 1994, the United Nations Development Program 
acknowledged the new meaning given to human security by including environmental secu-
rity as one of its components (Barbosa, 2008). 
In this phase, the average time to becoming consultative member in the ATS was re-
duced to little more than four years. The demand for science production, used as a political 
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tool to restrict access to consultative status was alleviated. Even so, the proportion of con-
sultative members hardly changed. In 1991, considering all members (41), the proportion of 
countries with consultative status (63%) was the same proportion as at the end of the first 
phase. The ATS reacted to the criticism regarding its restricted nature by broadening mem-
bership and facilitating the transition to consultative status; yet the same percentage of ac-
tive members remained as in the previous period.  
The end of this second phase coincides politically with the fragmentation of the Soviet 
Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In a single movement, the Cold War and the 
geopolitics of bipolarity – factors that contributed to originating the ATS regime – were dis-
continued. From the environmental perspective, the Madrid Protocol completed the archi-
tecture of the ATS as a system. 
Leader Mikhail Gorbachev took office (1985) with the mission of revitalizing the Soviet 
economy and reversing the stagnation of centralized planning. The restructuring planned by 
perestroika contrived an introduction of market mechanisms to promote a more efficient 
economic model followed by a political project of democratic openness and transparency 
(glasnost). These reforms, however, coincided with a sharp decline in the price of the barrel 
of oil, jeopardizing revenues from this industry and aggravating the problems of the Soviet 
economy. 
During the last years of the USSR, its monolithic superpower structure was consumed 
(Hobsbawm, 2000). The political-ideological unity collapsed when Gorbachev refused to ap-
ply the Brezhnev doctrine to the Eastern European countries. Within two years (August 1989 
to June 1991), the regimes of satellite-states ceased to exist. The Soviet Union itself, once a 
federation of fifteen republics, split into an equivalent number of independent political and 
economic entities. 
Despite the fact that the ATS was forged by the hegemonic leadership exerted by the 
USA and the USSR, the decline of the latter did not compromise it. The regime succeeded in 
overcoming the objections about its colonial character and moved away from its bipolar 
past, demanding a better alignment to the new world order. Keohane (1983) explains the 
expansion of regimes based on the increasing returns brought by the entrance of new mem-
bers. In this case, the rise in membership conferred more legitimacy and recognition to the 
ATS as an international regime. The endorsement of the Madrid Protocol, because of its 
detrimental aspect to latent economic interests of the ATS members, gave the impression 
of credibility and trustworthiness to their purposes.  
4. No more questions for now. The recognised third phase (1992- to 
date)  
The end of the bipolar system and the rise of new democracies in former Eastern Eu-
rope led to territorial fragmentation as well as to new regional integration projects. The 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) initiated the reunification of Europe and, together with China's 
turn towards market socialism, was one of the factors that advanced global expansion of 
economic liberalism. The New World Order increased globalization and the transnationali-
zation of problems related to the environment, drug trafficking and terrorism. 
The third phase strengthened the previous restructuring of the ATS, displaying few 
differences in terms of its composition. In more than two decades, only thirteen countries 
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became members of the regime, five of them being veterans that had belonged to the for-
mer Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Part of this "lack of interest" for joining the ATS may 
be ascribed to the prohibition of mineral exploitation by the Madrid Protocol and to the 
global prosperity context that prevailed until 2008. 
The most eloquent episode of the new legitimacy attained by the ATS was the access 
of two countries that had previously disapproved of the regime and championed the inter-
nationalization of the continent. Malaysia (2011) and Pakistan (2012) had, for years, op-
posed what they called the "exclusive, total and arbitrary" nature of the rights granted to 
the consultative parties (Azraii 1986, 312). With the approval of the Madrid Protocol, the 
Malaysian campaign against the ATS cooled. In 1998, the New Zealand government made 
its base in Antarctica available to Malaysian researchers and this bestowal helped subdue 
the country's foreign policy. Despite the pragmatic need to adjust to the geopolitical and 
economic challenges of the 21st Century and prioritize its relations with the West, Malaysia, 
fearing to alienate its allies from the South-South bloc, postponed its accession to the ATS 
until 2011.  
Pakistan's strategy resembled India´s, in connection with its reversal of the order of 
the procedures. Two expeditions were carried out between 1991 and 1993, and a station 
was erected in Antarctica. Pakistan became a member of the Scientific Committee on Ant-
arctic Research (SCAR) in 1990, but only entered the ATS in 2012.  
The legal understanding is that the ATS cannot prohibit non-signatory States from set-
tling on the continent, provided that it is with peaceful intentions and for the purpose of sci-
entific research. On the other hand, the norms of International Law determine that any settle-
ment in Antarctica is under the jurisdiction of the flag it bears, forming a national space within 
a territory under international administration. As the regime lacks enforcement mechanisms, 
signatories are compelled to convince other states of the advantages of joining the ATS. In the 
past, the legal interpretation was more severe. In 1976, for instance, the government of Ar-
gentina denied authorization to an Italian expedition leaving from Buenos Aires to Antarctica 
because the country was not a signatory of ATS (Vicuña, 2000). 
In this third phase, the environmental issue became more relevant in the international 
scenario. The politicization of environmental problems led to the foundation in 1988 of an 
institution with political and scientific characteristics, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC). Furthermore, the UNCED-92 was held in Rio de Janeiro, an event of 
great media success that mobilized 172 countries and countless heads of state. During the 
meeting two important agreements were entered: the biodiversity and the climate change 
conventions. Despite the auspicious beginning, the political and economic demands 
prompted by the Gulf War and the expansion of globalization hindered the establishment 
of an international cooperative model in the environmental sphere (Lago, 2006). 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a regulatory instrument aimed at en-
suring the sustainable use of biodiversity and the protection of the sovereign rights of 
emerging countries to genetic resources in their territory. The CBD also seeks to reconcile 
these interests with the compliance to patents and intellectual property norms of the tech-
nologically rich countries (Lago, 2006). However, as was the case with CRAMRA and UNCLOS, 
the legal situation of Antarctica excludes it from the CBD, creating legal uncertainty. Bio-
prospection executed by private laboratories for commercial purposes in an international 
environment under territorial claims is a complex and controversial subject that will require 
legislation compatible with the letter of the ATS (Loose, 2011). 
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5. Conclusion 
The intention of this paper was to avoid a merely descriptive report and to explore, 
from a systemic perspective, the evolution of the ATS in political, economic and environ-
mental terms. We know that appraisal of the ATS gives rise to many debates and controver-
sies and, in turn, chose to focus instead on how the great structures of the international 
system served as the theoretical axis of the regime. We identified external drivers, such as 
the bipolar order, decolonization in the 1970s, and the distension between superpowers, in 
order to help explain the transformations within the ATS. In the light of changing circum-
stances, the ATS was compelled to overcome a postcolonial type of rule and admit the active 
participation of states of the Global South, consider the exploitation of mineral resources 
and endorse an environmental protocol. 
We refrained from drawing too much attention to aspects related to the internal pol-
itics of each State, yet some degree of analysis at the unit level was necessary. For their 
leading role in the evolving of the ATS, the admissions of Brazil, China, India and Malaysia 
were examined. 
Krasner (1985) speculates that if the ATS had been established in the 1970s, it would 
probably have proclaimed Antarctica as mankind’s common heritage, acknowledging the new 
political balance of forces in the world. The Cold War together with the bipolarity of the turn 
of the 1950s and a still hesitant decolonization process all contributed to the ATS not being 
contested to any large degree. It was only when developing nations proceeded to occupy a 
more outstanding role in international relations that the ATS began favoring a greater number 
of signatories and improved its legitimacy. The requirements to accede to the status of con-
sultative member lessened and thus the decision-making monopoly was attenuated. The fre-
quency and transparency of the meetings improved and secured a wider debate for consen-
sus-based decision-making. The regime has shown that it has the ability to adapt to changes 
in the international system, which can explain its durability and robustness. 
Despite these advances, the regime is still viewed with reservations by a certain num-
ber of scholars. The avowed Eurocentric profile of the ATS reproduces a Westphalian matrix 
of power akin to post-colonial geography, and a significant part of its scientific output is still 
being produced by the original members in a unique combination of political and scientific 
interests. (Walton, 2012; Dodds, 2006; 2010; 2017). Whilst improving in terms of legitimacy 
and fairness, further research is required in order to evaluate if the ATS is effectively capable 
of addressing current challenges and global responsibilities.  
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